



**INTERIM REPORT**  
**OF**  
**FIFTH STATE FINANCE COMMISSION**  
**WEST BENGAL**

**November, 2022**  
**Bikash Bhavan, Salt Lake**  
**Kolkata - 700 091**



## **1.00 Introduction**

1.01 The Fifth State Finance Commission (herein after 5<sup>th</sup> SFC) was constituted by the Governor of West Bengal in conformity with the provisions as contained in the Article 243-I and 243-Y of the Constitution of India.

1.02 Under Article 243-I of the Constitution of India, the Governor of a state, at the expiration of every fifth year from the commencement of the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act,1992, is to constitute a Finance Commission to review the financial position of the Panchayats and to make recommendations to the Governor as to—

- (a) The principles which should govern-
  - (i) the distribution between the state and the Panchayats of the net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees leviable by the State, which may be divided between them under this Part and the allocation between the Panchayats at all levels of their respective shares of such proceeds;
  - (ii) the determination of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees which may be assigned to, or appropriated by, the Panchayats;
  - (iii) the grants-in aid to the Panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the State;
- (b) the measure needed to improve the financial position of the Panchayats;
- (c) any other matter referred to the Finance Commission by the Governor in the interests of sound finance of the Panchayats.

1.03 Article 243-Y of the Constitution directs upon the State Finance Commission to review the financial position of the Municipalities and recommend to the Governor on the similar points as prescribed for the Panchayats under Article 243-I.

1.04 The Government of West Bengal vide its Notification No.132-FB dated 23.5.22 has appointed the present Commission with the following members:

- |   |   |                  |
|---|---|------------------|
| 1. Dr. Abhirup Sarkar<br>Professor (Retd.), Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata | : | Chairman         |
| 2. Smt. Barnali Biswas, IAS (Retd.)   | : | Member           |
| 3. Shri Asis Kumar Chakraborty, WBCS (Exe.) (Retd.)                               | : | Member           |
| 4. Smt. Ruma Mukherjee  | : | Member           |
| 5. Shri Swapan Kumar Paul, IAS (Retd.)  | : | Member-Secretary |

1.05 Terms of reference of the 5<sup>th</sup> SFC are same as specified in clause (a) and (b) of Article 243-I and Article 243-Y of the Constitution. Additionally, the aforesaid Notification enjoins upon the Commission to regard, inter-alia, to:

- (i) the resources of the State Government and the demands thereon on account of expenditure on administration, development and debt-servicing;
- (ii) the resource-raising powers of the Panchayats and Municipalities;
- (iii) the responsibilities entrusted upon the Panchayats and Municipalities by Statutes and Government Orders;
- (iv) awards given by the Central Finance Commission to the local bodies;
- (v) grants given by the State Government to the local bodies beyond the recommendation of the State Finance Commission and the Central Finance Commission.

1.06 The 5<sup>th</sup> SFC, West Bengal constituted in end May, 2022, has started working from 1<sup>st</sup> June, 2022 at its earmarked Office at Bikash Bhavan, Salt Lake, and Kolkata-700091. The Chairman, other Members and the Member-Secretary all joined within the second week of June, 2022.

## **2.00 Why Interim Report**

2.01 The Commission has reviewed the status of constitution of earlier Finance Commissions and reports submitted by them followed by the ATR of the State Government. A summarised version is given in Table 2.01.1.

2.02 As it appears, the preceding Commission i.e. the Fourth State Finance Commission (herein after 4<sup>th</sup> SFC) submitted its report on 2nd March, 2016 and the Action Taken Report against it was tabled before the West Bengal Legislative Assembly on 20<sup>th</sup> June, 2022. The reference period of recommendations of the 4<sup>th</sup> SFC was from 2015-16 to 2019-20 and the reference period of the present Commission (hereinafter the Commission) as mentioned in the Finance Department's Notification No. 132-FB dated 23.5.22 is from 2020-21 to 2024-25. Thus the 5<sup>th</sup> SFC was constituted after two years from the time its recommendations should have been implemented.

2.03 The Commission therefore considers it prudent to submit an interim report to the Government to facilitate its budgetary process.

## **3.00 Issues and Approach**

3.01 The Commission, as a part of its primary responsibility, reviewed the reports of the earlier SFCs and the action taken reports together with the status of actual implementation by the Government of West Bengal. It appears, that the State Government whether principally accepting the entirely recommended amount or a reduced portion, there was always a gap between the accepted devolution in the Action taken Report (ATR) and the actual devolution. Cases of two previous successive Commissions may be taken up.

3.02 The 3rd SFC recommended for an untied fund allocation to the tune of Rs. 800 crore constituting around 5% of the State's own net tax revenue for 2008-09 with an annual increase of 12% for subsequent financial years. 20% of this fund was to be utilised by the Local Self Governments for maintenance of Assets. Inter-tier allocation within ZP, PS and GP was recommended as 12:18:70 and distribution between PRIs and ULBs was recommended as 76:24. The commission favoured the idea of continuing 2% of untied fund as incentive fund. Although the reference period of the 3<sup>rd</sup> SFC was from 2008-09 to 2012-13 the fund had actually started to be devolved from 2010-11. The State Government could not fulfil its commitment, both in terms of actual allocation and its timing though the principle was accepted in the ATR (Table 3.02.1).

3.03 The Fourth State Finance Commission recommended grants to the tune of Rs.1103.80crore for the financial year 2015-16 and progressive enhancement at the rate of 15% per annum from 2016-17 to 2019-20. The State Government in their ATR, however, agreed to devolve Rs.900 crore to the Local bodies for the year 2016-17 with an annual increase of 3% from 2017-18 to 2019-20. Actual devolution, however, was not in conformity with the commitment in the ATR. Table 3.03.1 will speak for itself.

3.04 As it is not possible for the Commission to visit the field within such a short time or to get the filled in questionnaires from the local bodies or get some commissioned studies on their functioning, all accepted procedures to arrive at a decision, the Commission organised some meetings with the representatives of the P&RD, Urban Development and Municipal Affairs and the Finance Department. The aspirations of the Departments towards better functioning of the Rural and Urban Local bodies together with the limitations of the Government towards devolution were perceived through these deliberations.

3.05 The Commission has also reviewed the other literature as far as practicable pertaining to the functioning of Rural and Urban Local bodies in West Bengal in recent past.

3.06 The Commission finally reviewed the recommendations of the Fifteenth Finance Commission pertaining to Rural and Urban Local bodies for the period 2021-2026 and the guiding principles of the Fifteenth FC while putting their recommendations. These principles are:

- i. Relevant ToR and the Constitutional provisions.
- ii. Pre-requisite of timely online availability in the public domain of both the accounts of the previous year and audited accounts of the year before the previous year for availing of grants for both rural and urban local bodies.
- iii. Pre-requisite of notifying minimum floor on property tax rates by States in order to increase the buoyancy of revenue of urban local bodies.
- iv. Inclusive and uniform approach for all three tiers within rural local bodies, Excluded Areas and cantonment areas.
- v. Inter se rural and urban share of devolution in the context of the evolving urban complexities and challenges.
- vi. Differential needs of urban habitations, including the special needs of emerging large urban areas as “agglomeration economies”.
- vii. Air pollution in Million-Plus urban agglomerations.
- viii. Focus on national priorities related to (a) strengthening of primary health care and creation of diagnostics infrastructure for management of disease and epidemics at the local level; (b) solid waste management; (c) provisioning for drinking water and sanitation; and (d) promoting and incentivising water recycling, rejuvenation and rainwater harvesting.
- ix. Importance of generation of internal resources like revenues from property taxation and tax on professions.

3.07 In the aforesaid recommendations the quantum of grants for rural local bodies and urban local bodies from the total allocation of grants is based on the ratio 67:33 for the first two years of 2021-22 and 2022-23, 66:34 in the next two years of 2023-24 and 2024-25 and 65:35 in the last year of the award, namely 2025-26. Unlike the 14<sup>th</sup> FC which recommended grant in favour of Gram Panchayats only, the 15<sup>th</sup> FC considered that grants should go to all the three tiers of Panchayati Raj institutions. They considered that the three tiers are parts of one system and are interlinked through backward and forward linkages. Availability of funds to all three tiers would improve functional coordination among them and facilitate the creation of assets across smaller jurisdictions, thereby increasing project viability in such areas.

3.08 As regards RLB, the 15<sup>th</sup> FC's recommendations are for two types of Grants— (i) Basic (Untied) Grant and (ii) Tied Grant. 40% of the total grants would be untied grants. Of the remaining 60% to be spent as tied grant, 30% shall be earmarked for sanitation and maintenance of ODF status and this should include management and treatment of household waste. Remaining 30% shall be earmarked for drinking water, rainwater harvesting and water recycling.

3.09 As for ULBs 40% of the total grant, to be treated as Untied Grant, can be spent on felt needs under the 18 subjects enshrined in the 12<sup>th</sup> Schedule except Salary and Establishment Cost. Of the remaining 60%, to be spent as Tied Grant, 50% will be earmarked for sanitation and solid waste management and the other 50% for Drinking water, rainwater harvesting and water recycling.

3.10 Since 61% of the Urban population lives in Urban Agglomeration which include ULBs, Census Towns and Outgrowths, the 15<sup>th</sup> FC has given differential treatment to the Urban Agglomeration with more than one million population in distribution of Urban Local

Bodies Grant. Accordingly, Urban areas have been grouped into two categories— Category-I cities having more than one million population and Category-II cities which include other than million plus cities.

3.11 Thus it appears that the Rural Local Bodies in West Bengal are likely to get a sum of Rs.17,199 crore from 15<sup>th</sup> FC during 2021-2026 while the entitlements of the Urban Local Bodies will be Rs.8792 crore. Table:3.11.1 will summarise this entitlement.

The increase is substantial compared to the amount recommended by the 14<sup>th</sup> Finance Commission as depicted in Table: 3.11.2

#### **4.00 Financial Health of the State Government**

4.01 Presently the world economy, as well as that of India, is going through exceptionally hard times. The pandemic has had its toll on the volume and range of financial transactions and economies are yet to recover from the shock. Quite expectedly, the strain has showed up in government budgets. While revenues going into the government coffers have taken a hit, expenses have soared, leading to increases in deficit and debt. West Bengal does not entirely fit into this general scenario. To put things into perspective, Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 record volume of tax and non-tax income of West Bengal and their year-on-year growth of since 2013-14.

4.02 A number of observations are immediate. First, growth of tax revenue is less unstable than growth of non-tax revenue. However, this should not be a serious concern because non-tax revenue constitutes a relatively small part of the total revenue of the government. Second, growth of tax revenue has been negative, i.e. tax revenue has actually gone down compared to the previous year, in 2019-20 and 2020-21. While the fall in tax revenue in 2020-21 can be

ascribed to the pandemic, it is not immediately clear why tax revenue went down in 2019-20. On the other hand, the sudden jump in the growth rate of tax revenue in 2017-18 is clearly due to the introduction of GST. But to what extent the optimistic stance of the revised budget for 2021-22 regarding growth of own tax revenue will be supported by actual figures remains an open question. Third, for non-tax revenue, it is not apparent as to why it went down in 2014-15 as well as 2019-20. Equally puzzling is the sudden spurt in non-tax revenue in 2016-17 and especially 2020-21 when the pandemic was in full blaze.

4.03 From all these observations we may conclude that over the last ten years revenue receipts have behaved erratically, non-tax revenue behaving more erratically than tax revenue. Efforts should be made to make the tax receipts process smooth. This will not only help the government to plan its budget more accurately, but also ensure a more uniform devolution to the local bodies.

4.04 On the expenditure side, there has been a spectacular rise in developmental expenditure over the last ten years. This, along with a substantial debt overhang, has made financial management a tightrope walk for the government. Table 4.4.3 records two most important components of committed expenditure, viz. pension and interest payments on past loans. The Fourth column of the table represents the total of these two committed expenditures and the fifth column represents the total own revenue (tax plus non-tax) of the government for ten years. The last column demonstrates that a very high percentage of own revenue has to be spent on the two committed expenditures. The figure hovers between an upper bound of 85% and a lower bound of 70%, where the lower bound itself is quite high. If repayment of principal is added to the interest payment then the situation appears gloomier.

4.05 The erratic growth rates of revenue, along with high proportions of committed expenditure, had two related consequences. First, the government had been compelled to

incur higher fiscal deficits to finance developmental expenditure in years of unforeseen financial crunch. Second, to meet the fiscal deficit, the government was forced to take more loans. Figure 1 and Figure 2 portray the long run behaviour of fiscal deficit and outstanding debt, both as proportions of Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) of West Bengal.

4.06 Two conclusions are immediate from Figure 1 and Figure 2. First, fiscal deficits have been more fluctuating than debt-GSDP ratios. Second and more important, though fiscal deficits and debt-GSDP ratios are still on the higher side, both are on a declining trend. In our opinion, this is a remarkable achievement, especially with respect to the second variable which is often considered to be a firm indicator of financial health.

4.07 Tables 4.7.4 and 4.7.5 show the magnitudes and proportion of devolution of tax and non-tax revenues of West Bengal over the recent past. The average devolution as SFC grants to local bodies, urban and rural taken together, over 2015-16 to 2021-22 has been 0.93% from tax revenue and 5.83% from non-tax revenue. From these figures it might appear that fund flows have been insufficient and inadequate for smooth functioning of the rural and urban local bodies. However, this is not actually so. We can use Table 4.7.6 to illustrate our point. It is clear from Table 4.7.6 that only a small part (given in the last row of the table) of the total devolution to local bodies are made through SFC grants. Much larger amounts, including salary grants, are devolved directly under other heads.

4.08 The above figures suggest that SFC grants are made for *gap funding*, i.e., to bridge the difference between the actual requirements of a local body and the actual devolution under other heads. A more extensive study is needed to assess this gap and the Fifth State Finance Commission shall undertake such study over the course of the next one year. Meanwhile, considering the financial health of the state as well as the past history of devolution, the Commission recommends that as an interim measure 1.5% of own tax revenue and 10% of

the non-tax revenue be devolved to the local bodies. Considering the improving financial health of the government, we recommend a higher percentage of actual devolution than done in the past. The total sum is to be distributed between the urban and the local bodies in proportion to the population in the urban and rural areas.

4.09 In the absence of clarity of roles of higher tier rural local bodies, the Commission found it challenging to determine the principles to be followed in working out the entitlement of these tiers. The Gram Panchayats (GPs) are supposed to be more autonomous local governments than Panchayat Samitis (PSs) or Zilla Parishads (ZPs). They have been given more fiscal autonomy by way of independent power to levy certain taxes. Even though most of their expenditure budget is driven by mandates from higher level governments, GPs play a role in project selection; hence they can be more responsive to special needs of the locality. On the other hand, even though they sit higher in the local government hierarchy, the PSs and ZPs have less fiscal discretion on the revenue side than the GPs. They may raise revenues from fees and charges, and have the authority to set the rate for some of these charges, but they have no taxing power. They rely primarily on grants and transfers for their general purpose finances (only about 10 to 15 percent of their revenues are raised from own sources). Though governed by elected councils, the districts and blocks appear to function largely as spending agents of the state and central governments. The higher tiers of PS and ZP, however, are responsible for inter-GP and inter-block development programmes, and occasionally do have to take up technically complicated projects even within a single GP through the untied funds at their disposal. Both the upper tiers are also required to maintain a large number of assets created by them in the course of implementation of different programmes as have been assigned to them by the state. They used to depend on the untied funds received from the state and centre for this purpose.

4.10 Table 4.10.01 records the distributive shares of the three tiers of RLB as recommended by the previous SFCs. The 14<sup>th</sup> FC had allocated its entire grant to the GPs and nothing to the two upper tiers. To compensate, the 4<sup>th</sup> SFC awarded a relatively small fraction of its total RLB grant to the lowest tier. This was an exceptional situation. The other three SFCs allocated a much larger share to the GPs, the average allocation being 60%. The present Commission accepts this proportion as fair and recommends that 60% of the total RLB grant be allotted to the GPs. The remaining 40% may be equally divided between the upper two tiers, each getting 20%.

Detailed interim recommendations are given in the next section.

## **5.00 Recommendations**

5.01 In the backdrop narrated above, the 5<sup>th</sup> SFC feels that the Government should adopt clear policies and take immediate decisions on the following issues:

i) For the purpose of vertical devolution a sum of Rs.905 Crore which constitutes 1.5% of the State's own Tax Revenue as available from Budget document may be fixed as the allocation for 2020-21 with a subsequent annual increase of 5% for the successive four years.

ii) The Commission recommends that the total untied fund allocation at the State level should be split into two segments— RLBs and ULBs. The rural-urban population ratio as per Census 2011 is 68:32. The Commission recommends this ratio as the ratio of allocation of funds between RLBs and ULBs.

iii) The Commission recommends the formula of 60:20:20 for inter-tier allocation of untied fund within the PRI Bodies. That is further to say, all GPs taken together would be allotted

60%, all PSs together 20% and all ZPs together 20% of the total untied fund earmarked for the RLBs. The details of the recommended allocation is summarised in Table 5.01.1.

iv) The Commission considers the relevance of continuing the idea of incentive fund of 2% of the total untied fund of the State for each year. This fund should be kept at the disposal of the two Departments as per ratio detailed below and may be devolved upon the respective RLBs or the ULBs on the basis of their performance towards proper reflection of Accounts in the Audit Reports and better utilisation of fund :

(A) Panchayats and Rural Development (68%)

(B) Municipal Affairs (32%)

v) As regards Taxes on Professions, Trade, Callings and Employment and Taxes on Vehicles, the Commission recommends that 30% (Thirty percent) of such collections should be shared between the Panchayats and the Municipalities in the ratio of 68:32 .

vi) The Commission thinks that till a full report is submitted, the Government may utilise the horizontal devolution matrix constituted by the 4<sup>th</sup> SFC.

## Tables and Figures

**Table 2.01.1**

**Status of Constitution of previous State Finance Commissions in WB**

<b>Sl. No.</b>	<b>SFC No.</b>	<b>Notification No. of constitution</b>	<b>Report submitted to the Government</b>	<b>ATR published by the State Government</b>
1	First	1023-FB dt.30.5.94	27.11.1995	22.7.1996
2	Second	1770-FB dt.14.7.2000	6.2.2002	15.7.2005
3	Third	4000-FB dt.22.2.2006	31.12.2008	16.7.2009
4	Fourth	121-FB dt.30.04.2013	02.02.2016	20.06.2022

**Table 3.02.1****Release to RLBs and ULBs vis-a-vis recommendation of Third SFC****(Rs. Crore)**

<b>RLB</b>				<b>ULB</b>		
<b>Year</b>	<b>Proposed total release by 3SFC</b>	<b>Actual Release</b>	<b>Percentage of release in terms of Recommendation</b>	<b>Proposed total release by 3SFC</b>	<b>Actual Release</b>	<b>Percentage of release in terms of Recommendation</b>
2010-11	608	301.8	49.5	192	137.24	71.35
2011-12	680.96	252.46	37.05	215.04	117.34	54.41
2012-13	762.67	568.34	74.54	240.84	172.86	71.66
2013-14	854.19	493.72	57.72	269.74	137.59	50.92
2014-15	956.69	411.11	42.99	302.11	137.59	45.36

Note: i) 12% enhancement was to be made for every successive year  
ii) 76% for RLBs and 24 % for ULBs calculated on Rs.800 crore  
iii) Release for 2014-15 available up to October, 2014

*Source : Department of P& RD and MA, GOWB*

**Table 3.03.1****Fourth SFC Recommendation vis-à-vis ATR wise devolution to ULBs & RLBs****(Rs. Crore)**

<b>Financial Year</b>	<b>ULB</b>			<b>RLB</b>		
	<b>SFC Recommendation vis-à-vis ATR</b>	<b>Actual Devolution</b>	<b>Actual as % of Recommendation</b>	<b>SFC Recommendation vis-à-vis ATR</b>	<b>Actual Devolution</b>	<b>Actual as % of Recommendation</b>
2015-16	442.49	232.95	52.65	631.31	522.47	82.76
2016-17	360.00	275.33	76.48	540.00	335.87	62.20
2017-18	371.00	153.63	41.41	556.00	394.71	70.99
2018-19	382.00	233.82	61.21	573.00	244.40	42.65
2019-20	393.00	196.44	49.98	590.00	379.08	64.25

Source: Finance Department, GOWB

**Table : 3.11.1**

**15<sup>th</sup> FC Recommendation to Local Bodies in West Bengal**

**(Rs. Crore)**

Rural Local Bodies						Urban Local Bodies					
21-22	22-23	23-24	24-25	25-26	21-26	21-22	22-23	23-24	24-25	25-26	21-26
3261	3378	3415	3617	3528	17199	1606	1664	1759	1863	1900	8792

Source : Fifteenth FC Report and the Action Taken Report of the GOI

**Table: 3.11.2****14<sup>th</sup> FCs recommendation to Local Bodies of West Bengal****(Rs. Crore)**

<b>Rural Local Bodies</b>						<b>Urban Local Bodies</b>					
<b>2015-2016</b>	<b>2016-2017</b>	<b>2017-2018</b>	<b>2018-2019</b>	<b>2019-2020</b>	<b>2015-2020</b>	<b>2015-2016</b>	<b>2016-2017</b>	<b>2017-2018</b>	<b>2018-2019</b>	<b>2019-2020</b>	<b>2015-2020</b>
1532	2122	2451	2836	3832	<b>12773</b>	637	882	1019	1179	1594	<b>5312</b>
<b>Performance Grant</b>											
	278	315	358	468	<b>1419</b>		260	295	335	438	<b>1328</b>

**Table : 4.1.1****Tax and non-tax revenue of West Bengal**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Tax Revenue (Rs Crore)</b>	<b>Non-Tax Revenue (Rs Crore)</b>	<b>Non-Tax/Tax (Percent)</b>
2013-14	35831	2023	5.6
2014-15	39412	1627	4.1
2015-16	42492	1861	4.4
2016-17	45466	2949	6.5
2017-18	57700	3117	5.4
2018-19	60732	3657	6.0
2019-20	60669	3212	5.3
2020-21	60287	5198	8.6
2021-22 (RE)	73904	2884	3.9
2022-23 (BE)	79346	6672	8.4

**Table : 4.1.2****Year-on-year nominal growth of tax and non-tax revenue of West Bengal (Percent)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Growth of Tax Revenue</b>	<b>Growth of Non-Tax Revenue</b>
2013-14	9.21	5.47
2014-15	9.99	-19.57
2015-16	7.81	14.44
2016-17	6.99	58.44
2017-18	26.91	5.67
2018-19	5.26	17.33
2019-20	-0.10	-12.15
2020-21	-0.63	61.79
2021-22 (RE)	22.58	-44.50
2022-23 (BE)	7.36	7.36

**Table : 4.4.3****Committed Expenditure as Proportion of Own Tax and Non-Tax Revenue**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Pension (Rs. Crore)</b>	<b>Interest (Rs. Crore)</b>	<b>Pension + Interest (Rs. Crore)</b>	<b>OTR+ONTR (Rs. Crore)</b>	<b>Pension+Interest as % of Own Revenue</b>
2013-14	11638	20757	32395	37854	85
2014-15	12128	21588	33716	41039	82
2015-16	12860	23115	35975	44353	81
2016-17	13945	25703	39648	48415	81
2017-18	14588	28074	42662	60817	70
2018-19	16063	28911	44974	64389	70
2019-20	18325	31306	49631	63881	78
2020-21	21263	33881	55144	65485	84
2021-22 (RE)	22538	36662	59200	76788	77
2022-23 (BE)	22997	39311	62308	86018	72

**Table : 4.7.4****Devolution of Own Tax Revenue (OTR) as SFC Grants**

<b>Year</b>	<b>P &amp; RD (Rs. Crore)</b>	<b>UD &amp; MA (Rs. Crore)</b>	<b>Total (Rs. Crore)</b>	<b>% of OTR</b>
2015-16	522.47	232.95	755.42	1.78
2016-17	275.33	335.87	611.20	1.34
2017-18	153.63	394.71	548.34	0.95
2018-19	233.82	244.40	478.22	0.79
2019-20	196.44	379.08	575.52	0.95
2020-21	133.80	127.55	261.35	0.43
2021-22	133.80	93.59	227.39	0.29

**Table : 4.7.5****Devolution of Own Non-Tax Revenue (ONTR) as SFC Grants**

<b>Year</b>	<b>P &amp; RD (Rs. Crore)</b>	<b>UD &amp; MA (Rs. Crore)</b>	<b>Total (Rs. Crore)</b>	<b>% of ONTR</b>
2015-16	23.00	145.08	168.08	9.0
2016-17	27.15	163.28	190.43	6.5
2017-18	20.49	177.73	198.22	6.4
2018-19	19.55	164.64	184.19	5.0
2019-20	0.00	152.05	152.05	4.7
2020-21	0.00	129.49	129.49	2.5
2021-22	1.00	191.86	192.86	6.7

**Table : 4.7.6****SFC's Share in Total Devolution**

	<b>2020-21</b>			<b>2021-22 (RE)</b>		
	P&RD	UD&MA	Total	P&RD	UD&MA	Total
Salary Grant	1181.07	1540.62	2721.69	1248.14	1778.65	3026.79
Non-Salary Grant	324.60	1824.31	2148.91	301.66	1796.17	2097.83
Other than Salary Grant	343.83	114.98	458.81	367.05	131.30	498.35
<b>SFC Grant</b>	133.80	127.55	261.35	133.80	93.59	227.39
CFC Grant	2206.00	1062.00	3268.00	3936.26	1414.42	5350.68
State Share for CSS Schemes	6898.90	1047.91	7946.81	3653.20	1975.21	5628.41
Grant for Development Schemes	1081.58	1268.01	2349.59	848.29	2129.60	2977.89
Central Assistance/Share	9774.17	2411.35	12185.52	7904.02	3163.71	11067.73
Total	21943.95	9396.73	31340.68	18392.42	12482.65	30875.07
<b>SFC Grant's Share in Total (%)</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>0.7</b>

All numbers are in Rs. Crore except the numbers in the last row which are percentages.

**Table 4.10.01**


**SFC Recommended Share of ULB & RLB (Percent)**

	<b>ULB : RLB</b>	<b>GP</b>	<b>PS</b>	<b>ZP</b>
<b>First SFC</b>	Respective Population	50	20	30
<b>Second SFC</b>	Proportion of Population	60	20	20
<b>Third SFC</b>	24:76	70	18	12
<b>Forth SFC</b>	40:60	24	40	36


**Table 5.01.1****Year Wise Allocations to RLBs and ULBs**

<b>LSG's Tier wise Allocation (Rs. Crore)</b>						
<b>Year</b>	<b>PRIs (68%)</b>				<b>ULBs (32%)</b>	<b>Total Allocation</b>
	<b>G.P (60%)</b>	<b>P.S (20%)</b>	<b>Z.P (20%)</b>	<b>RLB Total (68%)</b>		
2020-21	369	123	123	615	290	905
2021-22	388	129	129	646	304	950
2022-23	407	136	136	679	319	998
2023-24	427	1453	143	713	335	1048
2024-25	448	150	150	748	352	1100

**Figure 1: Gross Fiscal Deficit as percentage of GSDP in West Bengal**



**Figure 2: Outstanding Debt as a percentage of GSDP in West Bengal**



*Abhirup Sarkar*

**(Prof. Abhirup Sarkar)**  
**Chairman**

*Barnali Biswas*

**(Barnali Biswas)**  
**Member**

*Asis Kumar Chakraborty*

**(Asis Kumar Chakraborty)**  
**Member**

*Ruma Mukherjee*

**(Ruma Mukherjee)**  
**Member**

*S. K. Paul*

**(Swapan Kumar Paul)**  
**Member-Secretary**